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Abstract
We explore the determinants of the number of long-term bank relations of listed Japanese firms using a
unique data set covering the sample period of 1982–1999. Japanese listed firms have about seven long-term
bank loan relations on average, but show a large variation around the mean. We use data on loan and equity
ownership to address the impact of the Japan-specific bank–firm relations and bank control on the number of
loans decision. We find that having a relation with a top-equity holding bank increases the number of bank
relations and debt-rich and cash-poor firms have more bank relations.
# 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.
JEL classification : G21; G32
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1. Introduction
We analyze the choice of the number of long-term banking relations of Japanese listed firms in
the period 1982–1999. Firm–bank relations are at the core of Japanese economic development in
the post-war period and it is widely believed that long-term loans have been essential to enhance
the rapid Japanese economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. As is well-known, in post-war Japan
long-term bank loans were the number one source of external funds for almost all firms (see
Fukuda, 2001). Except for a few cash-rich firms, internal financing was, in general, limited. As
Ito (1992) shows, internal financing in the 1960s and 1970s has been only about 20% of the total
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corporate financial needs (as compared to 50% for the U.S.). The dominant role of long-term
loans in external finance is reflected in the fact that until the mid-1980s bond financing has been
strictly regulated (even after 1985 only very large firms were able to issue bonds). Large banks
were also key players in the Japanese industrial group structure called keiretsu, wherein lending
activity, combined with equity ownership, was relatively important (see, e.g. Flath, 1993). And
still in the keiretsu structure, firms have a strong and long-lasting relation with the so-called main
bank in the group. The main bank plays a dominant role in providing loans to the affiliated firms,
but firms nonetheless borrow from banks outside the group. We investigate why firms have ties
with other banks besides their main bank and what determines the optimal number of creditors in
the presence of main banks.
It is often argued that the bank–firm relationship changed in the course of the bubble (up to
1989)—and post-bubble (after 1990) period. There are several factors that explain this change.
First, financial deregulation allowed firms to issue public debt, which made firms less reliant on
bank loans. Secondly, banks are burdened with heavy non-performing loans after the collapse of
the bubble, which hindered the intermediary role of banks. A rather unique feature of our data
enables us to answer this question empirically. Our data set contains the time-series information
for long-term loans for the years 1982–1999. How does the bad loan problem affect individual
firm decisions to contract banks?We illustrate this in Fig. 1, which gives the percentage of single-
bank relations of 14,055 firm-year observations for the years 1982–1999. The percentage of
single-bank to all relations is at most 13% and, on average, Japanese firms do have multiple
banking contacts. Fig. 1 also suggests that during the bubble period firms tended to rely on a
single relation, while in the period of long stagnation after the collapse of the bubble the average
percentage of multiple contracts increases.
Our study, based on this unique data set, has advantages over the previous studies. Contrary to
earlier cross-section studies on the optimal number of bank relationships (see, e.g. Detragiache
et al., 2000; Degryse and Ongena, 2001; Houston and James, 2001) we exploit, like Farinha and
Santos (2004) and Foglia et al. (1998), both the time and cross-sectional variation. Farinha and
Santos, though, focus on the timing of switching from one to multiple bank relations for
especially young firms and Foglia et al. study the effects of the borrowing structure on the
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Fig. 1. Percentage of firms with a single long-term bank loan.
thoroughness of the banking system’s overall monitoring of individual borrower firms. The scope
of our paper is broader, as we have a general interest in multiple relations of large listed Japanese
firms, for which control of ownership matters. We include information with respect to the
Japanese corporate (bank) control mechanism using variables that define top loan and equity
ownership on the firm level. This feature is especially relevant to the keiretsu structures.
We proceed as follows. First, we give a review of the literature on the determination of the
optimal number of bank relations and main bank contacts. The theoretical background of our
paper is a key problem in financial economics: what is the optimal number of creditors? These
creditors can be holders of either public or private claims. We analyze the private component,
namely the number of bank contracts per firm (which finds support in the fact that the Japanese
bond market has been less important in the provision of debt). In the literature on corporate
finance, the main interest lies on the game between the provider of capital and the firm regarding
the control rights that belong to the assets. This game can cover the choice between equity and
debt, the rights of equity holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), or the composition of external
financing (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).We pay special attention to the literature that relates the
theory of the optimal number of bank contacts and the role of main banks. Next we describe the
data which are provided by the Japan Economic Research Institute and the Development Bank of
Japan and form a rather rich set of detailed balance sheet and profit–loss account data as well as
indicators of ownership of both (long-term) loans and equity. We give an extensive descriptive
overview of the variables of interest in Section 3. In Section 4 we present an econometric analysis
of the decision to borrow from different banks. Since our main dependent variable, the number of
bank relations, is a discrete variable, we estimate several discrete choice models. We find that
size, profitability, solvability, liquidity, and alternative financing forms determine the number of
banking contacts. We also find support for the liquidity insurance argument to have multiple
relations. Finally we show that firms having a so-called main bank relation tend to have a
preference for multiple loan contacts. In the last section we summarize and conclude.
2. Theory on the optimal number of banking relations
Across the globe it is widely observed that firms deal with more than one bank.1 In this section
we review the theoretical literature on multiple bank relationships. The most intuitive
explanation of the existence of a single bank relation is based on cost minimization: to deal with
more than one bank is costly. First, transaction costs increase because both screening and
monitoring costs are duplicated. It is more expensive to market debt claims to multiple creditors
(Bris and Welch, 2005). These arguments are at the core of the Diamond (1984) delegated
monitoring model. The Diamond model predicts a firm to deal with a single bank that pools the
costs of asymmetric information. A single bank moreover avoids free-riding problems by private
investors. So in all activities prior and during the loan contract it would be cheaper to deal with a
single bank. But also in ex post cases, like in the case of bankruptcy, multiple relations will
increase the costs of, e.g. handling debt renegotiation (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).
The second determinant of the number of banking relationships is the degree of competition
in the banking market. If competition is low (a few institutions dominate the market) it is likely
that the number of banking relationships drops. The incumbent bank will be able to extract rents
(see Broecker, 1990). On the other hand, if competition is fierce and a large number of
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1 See Ongena and Smith (2000a,b) and Volpin (2000) for international evidence on multiple bank relationship.
competing banks fight for new loans, firms will try to benefit and increase the number of bank
contacts.
Third, and related to the second item, is the hold-up problem. If a relationship bank is not
affected by heavy competition, it might consider using the acquired private corporate information
to extract rents, thus distorting entrepreneurial incentives and causing inefficient investment
choices (see Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Carletti (2004) presents a theoretical monitoring model
to explain this idea. Multiple banking entails duplication of effort and sharing of benefit, which
lead to a reduction in the overall monitoring intensity but not necessarily to higher loan rates, due
to the presence of diseconomies of scale in monitoring. Another form of the hold-up problem
might also exist. In a competitive banking environment, a high-quality firm that tries to switch
from its previous to a new loan provider gets pooled with low-quality firms and might be forced to
pay too high an interest rate. This prevents a high-quality firm from increasing the number of
banking relationships.
A fourth class of arguments against the case of single banking relates to using multiple
contacts as insurance against liquidity or liquidation risk. The worst case for the firm is that a
profitable project has to be liquidated prematurely. Suppose that the loan includes a refinancing
stage. If the relation bank cannot rollover their initial loan the firm in liquidity need has to apply
for loans from non-relation banks (arm’s-length financiers). These banks probably think that the
applying firms have ‘lemon’ projects (see also Detragiache et al., 2000).
A fifth class of arguments is formed by the ability among lenders to coordinate activities in an
environment with so-called soft-budget constraints. In a largely decentralized economy, banks
cannot commit to finance unprofitable long-term projects because dispersed banks with limited
capital will find it costly to coordinate actions (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and
Scharfstein, 1996; Bris and Welch, 2005). In the Bolton–Scharfstein model the manager has an
incentive to strategically default the project (e.g. by diverting cash to herself). Coordinating with
multiple lenders disciplines themanager. On the other hand itmight be the case that fewer creditors
have more incentives to check managers. Such creditors have an incentive to invest more in
monitoring activity (see Bris and Welch, 2005). Writing debt contracts with multiple lenders is
costly though (see the first class of arguments). In any case, a decrease of default risk will increase
the number of lenders. The same holds to the degree of synergy between the assets of the firm (the
degree to which the assets are worth more together than apart) or the liquidation value.
Finally, the type of business activity might affect the number of creditors. Take the example of
a highly innovative, high quality firm that invests to a large extent in R&D. If this firm believes
that it will be successful, it will not be willing to give all the information to multiple financiers
(see Yosha, 1995). Low-quality firms on the other hand might want to contact multiple banks.
Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (1998) analyze a model that includes the competition on the output
market for firms. The main point is again that leakage of information is detrimental to a firm’s
success on the output market. The firm can avoid this in two ways. First, it decides on the amount
of information given to creditors, and second, it can change the number of contacts. If a firm gives
more information to a bank and its quality is high, it can get a lower interest rate. More creditors
again intensify competition. Highly rated firms optimally try to deal with many banks and will
disclose as little information as they can. Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) stress the point that it
might be optimal for a bank to inform competitors of the innovating firm with respect to the new
technology in order to avoid financial distress. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) also predict that
firms in non-cyclical industries will chose a lower number of lenders.
Next we turn to the role of a main bank. The main bank of a firm is frequently defined as the
bank with the largest share of loans. However, main bank relations are not simply confined to
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lending relationships, but cover a wider spectrum of aspects. Aoki et al. (1994) stress five aspects
of main bank relations: lending relationship, client issuances of public debt, equity cross-
shareholding, business settlement accounts, and provision of information services and
managerial resources. Intertwined with each other, these relations determine the optimal
number of creditors of the firms affiliated with their main bank. However, there are very few
studies directly dealing with the determination of the optimal number of creditors in the context
of a main bank system.2 To consider this issue, it is important to understand why main bank
financing is so prevalent. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) discuss benefits and costs of main bank
financing. A main bank holds a large share of loans of affiliated firms, which gives a strong
incentive to collect information about firms’ prospects and to monitor the firms. It helps to
mitigate problems with asymmetric information that lead to adverse selection and moral hazard.
The studies of Kaplan and Minton (1994), Sheard (1994a), Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997),
Miyajima (1998) and Morck and Nakamura (1999) provide the evidence that main banks closely
monitor their client firms and dispatch directors to them in the event of financial trouble. Close
monitoring by a main bank enables other banks to reduce the resources spent on gathering
information and monitoring, as is suggested by Diamond’s delegated monitoring model (see
Diamond, 1984). Other banks let the main bank monitor the firm on behalf of them. Sheard
(1994b) discusses the efficiencies of main bank lending from the point of view of avoidance of
monitoring duplication. Having a line of credit from a main bank, it might also be easier for the
firm to attract more loans from other banks. Close monitoring also helps to identify the types of
distress their clients face and thus reduce the cost of distress (Hoshi et al., 1990; Sheard, 1994c).
Furthermore, shareholding by a main bank leads to mitigation of conflict between equity holders
and debt holders.3 Taken together, affiliated firms might raise funds easily from other banks since
other banks do not have to bear the expenses associated with lending. Thus the optimal number of
creditors will be larger for firms affiliated with a main bank than for independent firms.
However, it should be noted that concentration of information about affiliated firms at a main
bank is a double-edged sword. Sheard (1989) argues that a Japanese firm might also be afraid of
monopoly exploitation by the bank, or banks themselves want to share risk, or regulation might
block larger loan supply by a single bank. Therefore there can be different arguments, even in the
group structure cases, why firms borrow from multiple banks. Prowse (1990) argues that debt-
rich firms tend to invest in projects that benefit shareholders. A way to circumvent this agency
problem is to align the debt and equity stakes in the firm. From a slightly different angle, we
might argue that too much dependence on a main bank is harmful to its affiliated firms. In the
1990s, banks were burdened with massive non-performing loans, which hindered the
intermediary role of banks severely. In this situation, excessive reliance on a main bank makes
it difficult for its affiliated firms to switch loans from one bank to the other since other banks have
not accumulated information on those firms.
3. Description of the data
The primary source of data used is the set of financial statements of firms listed on the main
Japanese stock markets. The dataset is compiled by the Japan Economic Research Institute and
the Development Bank of Japan. In addition to the balance sheet and profit–loss accounts, a
2 Exceptions are Horiuchi (1993, 1994) who present a descriptive analysis of multiple bank relations of Japanese firms.
3 It should be noted that group main banks are not always acting in the interest of the firms, given that these firms are
charged higher interest rates (see Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998).
qualitative and detailed description of stock ownership structure and sources of long-term loans is
also given. As for the stock ownership structure, the dataset reports the top-10 shareholders’
names and the corresponding stakes in total number of shares. It also reports the origins of long-
term loans in terms of the name of the issuing financial institution and the corresponding stakes in
outstanding long-term loans. That is to say, we can identify fromwhich financial institution(s) the
firms attract long-term loans.4 The dataset starts in 1957, but the qualitative information on the
stock ownership and long-term loans is only available for the period from 1982 to 1999.
The total number of firm-year observations from 1982 to 1999 is 34,939. Some of the
observations are excluded, mainly due to internal inconsistencies. For instance, in some cases the
total sum of each source of the long-term loans outstanding does not match the individual balance
sheet registration. In most cases, the former is smaller than the latter, indicating that the
information on the sources of long-term loan is sometimes not exhaustive. Also, the source of a
long-term loan in some cases does not correspond to a specific individual financial institution, but
is classified in the ‘‘miscellaneous financial institutions’’ category. In such cases we cannot
identify the accurate number of bank relations. This is also true for the case of ‘‘foreign banks.’’
As a result of this data screening, 20,740 firm-year observations remain in the sample.5
We define the total number of banks that provide long-term loans as the number of long-term
loan banking contacts of the corresponding firms.6 Table 1 presents the number of long-term bank
relations and related indicators over the sample period. We classify the number of bank relations
into the following seven classes:
(1) no long-term loan;





(7) more than 16 relations.7
As is shown in row (13) of the table, the percentage of firms with long-term loans shows a decline
during the sample period. This is mainly due to the development of alternative financing
methods, like corporate bond and equity financing. It should be noted that the percentage of firms
with long-term loans remains more than 65% in recent years, indicating that the instrument of a
long-term loan is still an important source of finance for Japanese firms. The percentage of single
loan cases, which is a special concern of this study, is shown in the bottom line of Table 1 (see also
Fig. 1 of Section 1).
The mean and the median of the number of long-term loan relations are shown in Fig. 2. The
average number of relations decreases from 7.74 in 1982 and reaches a lowest level of 6.65 in
1989. After 1990, the number moves around 7 except for the sharp decline in 1997. This means
that the concentration of long-term loans has been gradually promoted in the bubble period, but
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4 The label financial institution refers to life and non-life insurance companies as well as public and private banks.
Insurance companies are also the main long-term funds suppliers in Japan.
5 Most of the firms in the sample are manufacturing firms. The distribution of the sample firms by industry is provided
in Appendix 1.
6 We do not take the duration of bank–firm relations into consideration in this study.
7 This categorization will be used for the estimation of the multiple-choice model in the next section. The distribution of


































Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans (NBL)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
(1) NBL = 0 – 158 200 235 258 283 315 355 391 406 404 409 404 416 446 479 502 516 508 6,685
(2) NBL = 1 – 49 59 59 66 70 82 86 90 96 93 69 62 69 65 69 94 103 89 1,370
(3) 2  NBL  4 – 142 140 154 158 155 149 149 172 187 191 192 207 189 213 220 260 254 244 3,376
(4) 5  NBL  7 – 162 176 159 160 188 179 184 184 189 202 204 187 207 222 230 236 272 286 3,627
(5) 8  NBL  10 – 117 126 148 144 138 140 126 146 153 159 156 165 140 157 170 168 187 195 2,735
(6) 11  NBL  15 – 104 90 87 106 89 96 88 85 94 103 111 126 142 143 134 126 138 157 2,019
(7) 16  NBL – 47 49 48 43 48 44 42 35 42 51 50 57 54 56 54 49 84 75 928
(8) Total – 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20,740
(9) Mean of NBL – 7.74 7.39 7.27 7.28 7.20 7.07 6.86 6.65 6.75 6.99 7.13 7.41 7.39 7.35 7.17 6.67 7.22 7.38 7.16
(10) Median of NBL – 7.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00
(11) Mean of
Herfindahl index
– 0.370 0.376 0.381 0.384 0.386 0.399 0.404 0.408 0.409 0.393 0.369 0.358 0.356 0.355 0.360 0.387 0.369 0.351 0.377
(12) Median of
Herfindahl index
– 0.281 0.290 0.285 0.283 0.288 0.286 0.292 0.299 0.297 0.284 0.273 0.263 0.251 0.257 0.265 0.282 0.260 0.254 0.276
(13) Long-term
loans (%)
– 79.7 76.2 73.6 72.4 70.9 68.7 65.5 64.6 65.2 66.4 65.7 66.6 65.8 65.7 64.7 65.0 66.8 67.3 67.8
(14) Single
relation (%)
– 7.9 9.2 9.0 9.7 10.2 11.9 12.7 12.6 12.6 11.6 8.8 7.7 8.6 7.6 7.9 10.1 9.9 8.5 9.7
recovered to the original level after the collapse of the bubble. The median of the number of long-
term bank relations is rather stable over the sample period.
As a final description of bank–firm relations, the time series of the Herfindahl index of long-
term loans per firm is presented in Fig. 3. The average of this index increases from 0.370 in 1982
to its maximum of 0.409 in 1990. The same pattern can be seen for the median value. The
concentration gradually decreases to a low level of 0.335 in 1995 and increases after.
4. Determinants of the number of bank–firm relations
We investigate the determinants of the number of bank–firm relations based on the balance
sheet and profit and loss account information of firms. It does not necessarily imply that we
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Fig. 3. Mean and median Herfindahl index of long-term loans.
Fig. 2. Mean and median number of long-term loans.
ignore the supply side of bank–firm relationships. It is true that even if the firm applies for a loan,
it is not always accepted by the bank, but the decision of the bank is mainly based on the firms’
information on profitability and solvency.8
We model the determination of the number of bank relations in two stages. First, firms decide
to have single or multiple bank relations. Second, firms decide how many bank relations they
have conditional upon the choice of having multiple bank relations. There may be a substantial
difference in the nature of choices of both types. In the estimation procedure, first we estimate the
decision to have a single- versus multiple-bank contract by a binary logit model. Next, the
decision to opt for multiple loans is analyzed using a multinomial logit model. We estimated the
same model for three different sample periods; the whole period (1982–1999), the ‘bubble’
period (1982–1989), and the post-bubble period (1990–1999).
Based on the discussion in Section 2, we use the following variables to explain the choice of
the number of bank relations:
 size of the firm: total real sales, SAL;
 profitability of the firm: return on assets, ROA;
 solvability of the firm: debt-to-assets ratio, DAR;
 liquidity of the firm: liquid to total assets ratio, LAR;
 alternative financing sources of the firm: corporate bonds to debt ratio, CBR and the short-term
loan to debt ratio, SLR;
 the R&D activity of the firm: R&D expenses to total sales ratio, R&D.
The sample means of the above variables in the whole sample and the two sub-sample periods are
presented in Table 2. There is a substantial difference in return on assets (ROA) between the
bubble period and the post-bubble period, indicating that the profitability of firms decreased after
the collapse of the bubble. The corporate bond to total debt ratio (CBR) drastically increased
from 5.29% in the former to 11.28% in the latter sample period. The decrease of the importance
of long-term loans over the sample period observed in Table 1 is partly explained by the
increasing importance of corporate bonds as an alternative financing source. The short-term loan
to total debt ratio (SLR) also decreases in the latter sample period, although it can also be
K. Ogawa et al. / Economic Systems 31 (2007) 49–70 57
Table 2
Sample means of the explanatory variables
Symbol Definition 1982–1999 1982–1989 1990–1999
(1) SAL Sales amounta 65.528 60.056 68.900
(2) ROA Return on total asset (%) 1.464 2.213 1.002
(3) DAR Debt-to-total assets ratio (%) 64.227 68.967 61.301
(4) LAR Liquid to total assets ratio (%) 59.294 64.603 56.024
(5) CBR Corporate bond to total debt ratio (%) 8.998 5.293 11.280
(6) SLR Short-term loans to total debt ratio (%) 19.637 20.733 18.961
(7) R&D R&D expenses to total sales ratio (%) 0.639 0.581 0.675
(8) No1 Number of observations in the first stage 14,055 5358 8697
(9) No2 Number of observations in the second stage 12,685 4797 7888
a Unit: billions of 1995 yen. The figures in the financial statements are deflated by the GDP deflator (1995 = 1.00) in the
Annual Report of National Account, Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office of the government of Japan.
8 Ideally the balance sheet information of the bank is needed to fully understand bank–firm relations.
regarded as an alternative to long-term financing.9 The table also provides the number of
observations available for estimation. In the estimation of the binomial logit model, 14,055
sample firms with long-term loans are included in the sample. It should be noted, however, that in
the estimation of the multinomial logit model, which is conditional upon the choice for more than
one relation, firms with a single bank relation are excluded from the sample. Accordingly, 12,685
sample firms are used for estimation in the second stage.
The pattern of financial governance of Japanese firms may play a crucial role in the
determination of the number of bank relations. The Japanese industrial organization differs to a
large extent from most western equivalents. Mutual ownership of stock is quite common,
especially in the industrial group structures (keiretsu). Within the group structure, long-lived
equity holdings and lender relations are the key financial characteristics. As is well known, banks
play a central role as ‘‘Main Bank’’ in these business groups, so it is valuable to incorporate the
relation between simultaneous holdings of loans and equity into the analysis, especially if we
want to test the hypothesis that firms with a main bank relation want fewer banking contacts. In
order to take this hypothesis into account, we classify the firms into the following seven
categories from the viewpoint of the interaction between loan and equity holdings10:
(1) the largest equity owner is also the largest debt owner;
(2) the largest equity owner resorts under the top-3 debt owners;
(3) the largest equity owner resorts under the top-10 debt owners;
(4) the largest debt owner resorts under the top-3 equity owners;
(5) the largest debt owner resorts under the top-10 equity owners;
(6) one of the top-3 equity owners resorts under the top-3 debt owners;
(7) one of the top-10 equity owners resorts under the top-10 debt owners.
Table 3 presents the percentage of firms for the above seven cases by year.11 As is expected, the
first class is the rarest case: a little more than 5% of the firm-year observations fall into this class.
Note that we consider all equity holders including non-bank equity holders. Although equity
ownership by banks is highly restricted in Japan,12 still about half of the firm-year observations are
classified in class (6) and about 90% of the firm-year observations in our sample fall in class (7).
In order to incorporate the effect of the governance structure measured by the interaction
between loan and equity holdings, we use dummy variables, reflecting the above seven
categories, in both the binomial and multinomial regression model. In what follows, we label
these ‘‘governance’’ dummy variables by GDi (i = 1, . . ., 7), where subscripts from 1 to 7 are
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9 Mean and standard deviations of the seven explanatory variables are shown by year in Appendix 3, where we observe
an apparent decrease of ROA and increase of both CBR and SLR.
10 These seven classes are not mutually exclusive. For example, class (1) is always included in the classes from (2) to (7).
In this sense, the category (1) is the case where the relation between loan and equity holdings is the strongest. This is also
true for a comparison between the classes (2) and (3), between (4) and (5), and between (6) and (7), where the classes (2),
(4), and (6) have the stronger relation, respectively.
11 The figures in Table 3 are those for the sample firms with long-term loans that are used in estimation. Needless to say,
if the firms with no long-term loans were included, the corresponding figures would be smaller. For example, the
percentage of class (7) in 1982 would be 66.88 (=83.98  621/779), where 621 is the number of firms with long-term
loans and 779 is the number that includes firms with no long-term loans (see Table 1).
12 In Japan, the maximum share of equity holding of a specific firm by a bank is restricted to at most 5% since 1987.
Before 1987, starting in 1953, this figurewas 10% (Flath, 1993). For insurance companies the maximum limit still is 10%.
It should be noted that in our dataset, financial institutions include life insurance companies as well as private banking
companies. The equities held by individual and institutions through trust banks are classified as individual holdings.
corresponding to the above 7 classes. That is to say, if the sample firm belongs to class (1), the
governance dummy variable, labeled GD1, takes 1, and otherwise 0 for corresponding
observations. It is expected that, moving from GD1 to GD3, for instance, increases the number of
multiple bank contacts. Although debt also contains non-loans, the probability of a single lending
relation decreases if the largest equity holder moves from the first debt holder to a top-10 debt
holder. If a top-10 debt holder moves from a top-10 equity holding position to the single top-
equity holder, one could argue that the relative probability of a single loan relation will become
larger. The bank can control the firm not only via the supply of loans, but also as a top-equity
holder. Thus the bank is probably willing to offset the liquidity risk the firm faces, lowering the
firm’s intentions to contact multiple banks. The firm has less costs of asymmetric information and
will also prefer a single relationship (see Sheard, 1989).
First, we present a binomial logit model for the decision to choose either a single loan or
multiple loans. In the logit estimation the dependent variable, Y, takes 1 for the case of single loan
and 0 for multiple loans. The results are presented for three different sample periods, the whole
period, the bubble period, and the post-bubble period, in Table 4. The rows give the results for
each type of governance dummy variables, say GDi (i = 1, . . ., 7) as listed above. The columns
give the estimated parameters of the corresponding determinants listed in Table 2. The last
column gives the pseudo-coefficient of determination (R2) and the correct prediction ratio (CPR)
of the estimated model. The impact of each determinant on the probability of choosing a single
bank relation can be calculated from the parameter estimates. For the discrete choice model, it is
more substantial to interpret the results in terms of probability rather than the parameter
estimates. In what follows, we will discuss the estimated results from the viewpoint of the impact
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Table 3
The relationship between stockholders and debt suppliers: percentage of firms in each category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1982 4.83 8.86 14.33 23.99 56.36 40.74 83.90
1983 4.22 8.28 12.81 25.16 57.03 42.34 84.22
1984 5.19 10.08 14.05 25.95 59.24 43.97 85.34
1985 4.73 10.19 13.59 26.29 59.97 43.87 84.93
1986 4.65 8.72 12.21 26.45 61.63 44.77 85.61
1987 4.78 9.28 12.61 28.41 63.77 45.36 87.25
1988 4.59 8.74 12.30 25.93 63.41 42.96 86.52
1989 5.06 9.13 13.20 30.76 66.57 46.63 87.36
1990 4.99 10.38 14.45 31.27 64.78 46.78 87.78
1991 4.88 10.01 14.02 31.79 63.70 46.56 87.23
1992 3.58 10.23 14.58 31.84 64.45 49.10 88.87
1993 5.22 12.19 16.67 34.95 68.28 51.99 90.17
1994 4.49 10.99 15.61 35.21 69.91 50.81 90.76
1995 5.84 11.68 16.71 32.71 68.69 48.95 90.42
1996 5.02 11.63 15.28 33.30 72.63 48.69 89.85
1997 5.47 10.83 14.68 34.30 72.45 49.30 88.96
1998 5.78 10.50 14.35 35.45 72.93 47.69 89.88
1999 5.83 11.09 14.91 36.81 72.75 49.14 89.39
Total 5.01 10.27 14.35 31.16 66.23 46.99 87.96
(1) The largest equity owner is also the largest debt owner; (2) the largest equity owner resorts under the top-3 debt owners;
(3) the largest equity owner resorts under the top-10 debt owners; (4) the largest debt owner resorts under the top-3 equity
owners; (5) the largest debt owner resorts under the top-10 equity owners; (6) one of the top-3 equity owners resorts under


































Estimation results of the binomial logit model of single and multiple relations
SAL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D GDi R
2/CPR
Sample period: 1982–1999
(1) GD1 0.0002 (0.85) 0.0086 (0.96) 0.0412** (19.6) 0.0371** (15.4) 0.0159** (7.81) 0.0007 (0.30) 0.0973** (4.26) 0.6442** (3.67) 0.0655/0.9030
(2) GD2 0.0003 (1.49) 0.0081 (0.92) 0.0406** (19.2) 0.0366** (15.2) 0.0165** (8.10) 0.0003 (0.13) 0.0915** (4.02) 1.4830** (8.62) 0.0727/0.9031
(3) GD3 0.0005
* (2.19) 0.0076 (0.86) 0.0401** (19.0) 0.0360** (15.0) 0.0174** (8.52) 0.0005 (0.20) 0.0795** (3.46) 1.9466** (11.3) 0.0810/0.9035
(4) GD4 0.0001 (0.45) 0.0106 (1.22) 0.0396** (18.8) 0.0367** (15.2) 0.0153** (7.48) 0.0013 (0.55) 0.0927** (4.07) 0.8158** (10.6) 0.0737/0.9039
(5) GD5 0.0002 (0.59) 0.0087 (0.98) 0.0373** (17.5) 0.0361** (14.8) 0.0142** (6.84) 0.0013 (0.56) 0.1058** (4.52) 1.0356** (16.7) 0.0853/0.9029
(6) GD6 0.0002 (0.92) 0.0133 (1.61) 0.0378** (17.9) 0.0357** (14.7) 0.0154** (7.41) 0.0007 (0.31) 0.0924** (4.07) 1.5811** (20.6) 0.1041/0.9031
(7) GD7 0.0003 (0.95) 0.0142 (1.61) 0.0295** (12.7) 0.0343** (12.9) 0.0136** (5.89) 0.0009 (0.36) 0.1155** (4.44) 2.8237** (39.6) 0.1891/0.9163
(1) GD1 0.0155 0.0020 0.0038 0.0025 0.0012 0.0001 0.0084 0.0516
(2) GD2 0.0265 0.0019 0.0038 0.0025 0.0012 0.0001 0.0079 0.1215
(3) GD3 0.0383 0.0018 0.0037 0.0024 0.0013 0.0001 0.0069 0.1589
(4) GD4 0.0085 0.0020 0.0037 0.0025 0.0011 0.0001 0.0080 0.0668
(5) GD5 0.0127 0.0018 0.0034 0.0024 0.0010 0.0001 0.0089 0.0842
(6) GD6 0.0159 0.0020 0.0034 0.0023 0.0011 0.0001 0.0077 0.1246
(7) GD7 0.0179 0.0013 0.0021 0.0020 0.0008 0.0000 0.0075 0.1830
Sample period: 1982–1989
(1) GD1 0.0006
* (2.02) 0.0001 (0.01) 0.0501** (13.9) 0.0374** (9.03) 0.0087* (2.22) 0.0045 (1.20) 0.1776** (4.59) 0.8325** (2.81) 0.0901/0.8960
(2) GD2 0.0007
* (2.20) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0499** (13.9) 0.0372** (9.01) 0.0094* (2.38) 0.0040 (1.08) 0.1733** (4.46) 1.6331** (5.61) 0.0980/0.8964
(3) GD3 0.0008
* (2.47) 0.0001 (0.00) 0.0499** (13.8) 0.0371** (8.94) 0.0105** (2.67) 0.0044 (1.18) 0.1603** (4.06) 2.1410** (7.38) 0.1080/0.8964
(4) GD4 0.0005 (1.66) 0.0015 (0.10) 0.0490** (13.6) 0.0367** (8.86) 0.0080* (2.02) 0.0052 (1.37) 0.1733** (4.48) 0.9426** (7.02) 0.0996/0.8954
(5) GD5 0.0003 (0.99) 0.0029 (0.20) 0.0449** (12.3) 0.0356** (8.51) 0.0071 (1.78) 0.0047 (1.26) 0.1974** (4.98) 1.1117** (10.9) 0.1124/0.8988
(6) GD6 0.0005 (1.63) 0.0100 (0.67) 0.0480** (13.0) 0.0351** (8.41) 0.0090* (2.24) 0.0041 (1.09) 0.1646** (4.19) 1.7969** (13.5) 0.1367/0.8951
(7) GD7 0.0003 (0.81) 0.0111 (0.71) 0.0354** (8.59) 0.0317** (6.74) 0.0050 (1.09) 0.0033 (0.84) 0.1884** (4.11) 3.0019** (25.3) 0.2350/0.9181
(1) GD1 0.0156 0.0007 0.0034 0.0030 0.0013 0.0001 0.0079 0.0526
(2) GD2 0.0267 0.0007 0.0033 0.0030 0.0013 0.0000 0.0074 0.1201
(3) GD3 0.0376 0.0006 0.0032 0.0029 0.0014 0.0000 0.0064 0.1562
(4) GD4 0.0001 0.0009 0.0032 0.0030 0.0012 0.0001 0.0075 0.0658
(5) GD5 0.0119 0.0007 0.0030 0.0029 0.0011 0.0001 0.0084 0.0820
(6) GD6 0.0160 0.0010 0.0029 0.0028 0.0012 0.0001 0.0072 0.1227


































(1) GD1 0.0003 (0.73) 0.0160 (1.53) 0.0363** (13.7) 0.0385** (13.0) 0.0182** (7.56) 0.0014 (0.46) 0.0485 (1.73) 0.5111* (2.34) 0.0556/0.9066
(2) GD2 0.0001 (0.24) 0.0153 (1.47) 0.0353** (13.4) 0.0377** (12.7) 0.0188** (7.75) 0.0017 (0.56) 0.0417 (1.50) 1.3819** (6.47) 0.0622/0.9069
(3) GD3 0.0001 (0.31) 0.0143 (1.38) 0.0346** (13.1) 0.0369** (12.5) 0.0195** (8.06) 0.0017 (0.56) 0.0300 (1.07) 1.8316** (8.57) 0.0696/0.9066
(4) GD4 0.0004 (0.99) 0.0178 (1.78) 0.0346** (13.1) 0.0383** (12.8) 0.0179** (7.38) 0.0009 (0.29) 0.0445 (1.60) 0.7707** (8.08) 0.0635/0.9064
(5) GD5 0.0007 (1.75) 0.0172 (1.66) 0.0333** (12.5) 0.0380** (12.6) 0.0168** (6.85) 0.0008 (0.26) 0.0509 (1.80) 1.0050** (12.7) 0.0740/0.9071
(6) GD6 0.0002 (0.55) 0.0174 (1.83) 0.0328** (12.5) 0.0373** (12.5) 0.0178** (7.26) 0.0015 (0.50) 0.0495 (1.80) 1.4747** (15.4) 0.0897/0.9077
(7) GD7 0.0010* (2.20) 0.0179 (1.71) 0.0268** (9.30) 0.0366** (11.2) 0.0168** (6.23) 0.0033 (1.04) 0.0721* (2.30) 2.7701** (30.2) 0.1675/0.9149
(1) GD1 0.0203 0.0013 0.0029 0.0031 0.0014 0.0001 0.0038 0.0405
(2) GD2 0.0064 0.0012 0.0028 0.0030 0.0015 0.0001 0.0033 0.1088
(3) GD3 0.0081 0.0011 0.0027 0.0029 0.0015 0.0001 0.0023 0.1431
(4) GD4 0.0278 0.0014 0.0027 0.0030 0.0014 0.0001 0.0035 0.0605
(5) GD5 0.0523 0.0013 0.0026 0.0029 0.0013 0.0001 0.0039 0.0775
(6) GD6 0.0143 0.0013 0.0025 0.0028 0.0014 0.0001 0.0038 0.1119
(7) GD7 0.0661 0.0011 0.0017 0.0023 0.0011 0.0002 0.0046 0.1765
The figures in parentheses are the asymptotic t-values, and the symbols * and ** indicate that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 5% level and 1% level,
respectively. R2 is the pseudo-R-squared and CPR stands for the correct prediction ratio by the estimated model. The impact of SAL on probability is in terms of 103. Marginal
probabilities are in the lower panel for each sample period.
on the probabilities. These figures are presented in the lower panel of the table for each sample
period.
Table 4 shows that a higher debt-to-assets ratio (DAR) decreases the probability of a single
loan relation in all cases. For example, for the whole period, an increase of DAR by one
percentage point lowers the probability of having a single loan by 0.21% (with GD7) to 0.38%
(with GD1 and GD2). This is quite a plausible result, because more debt implies a higher loan
demand, which increases the probability of multiple loans. It is also found that a higher liquid to
total assets ratio (LAR) increases the probability of a single bank relation. Firms with relatively
more liquid assets do not need liquidity insurance and rely on a single bank. Table 4 also shows
that the size of the firm (SAL) and profitability (ROA) do not have a systematic impact on the
decision between single and multiple bank loans. Of the alternative financing forms, the short-
term loans SLR and the corporate bond to total debt ratio CBR, only the corporate bond to debt
ratio has a significant impact on the single versus multiple loan relation decision. A higher value
of CBR indicates two features: more bonds relative to loans will increase the probability of a
single loan by itself. But secondly, as explained above, corporate bonds also signal quality. A
higher bond rating reduces the need for multiple banking contacts.
The governance dummies GDi (i = 1, . . ., 7) have a significant negative impact on the
probability of a single bank relation in any case. This counterintuitive result can be interpreted
from the following different angles. First, the firm might use a main bank relation as a signal of
quality in attracting other debt suppliers’ attention.13 It is similar to a favorable impact on a firm’s
stock price when it publicly reveals information about a bank relationship. The news that a firm
has a main bank may imply that the main bank will bail the firm out in case of financial trouble,
which may prompt other banks to lend to the firm. Secondly, a main bank might take advantage of
its position as information monopolist and charge higher interest rates.14 This is known as the
hold-up problem. To prevent the hold-up problem, firms might have multiple bank relations to
look for cheaper alternatives. Thirdly, as is discussed by Detragiache et al. (2000), when the main
bank health deteriorates, the firm has an incentive to diversify bank relations to secure stable
loans from different banks. This story is especially applicable to the Japanese financial scene in
the late 1990s, when a lot of financial institutions went into bankruptcy. Finally, it might be in the
interest of the main bank as an equity holder to have some liquidity insurance. If we compare the
results of the GDi-lines one should note that for the cases where the bank is the largest equity
holder, the probability of a single borrowing relation decreases with a more modest position of
the bank as a top-debt supplier. The other way round, if the bank is the largest supplier of debt, the
probability of a single relation increases if the bank becomes a more important equity holder. So
there are two effects: a main bank relation leads to a larger probability of multiple banking
contacts, but equity concentration leads to a relatively higher probability of a single loan.
Comparing the bubble and post-bubble period one can observe that there are no substantial
differences in terms of marginal effects on the probabilities. An increase of the debt-to-assets
ratio decreases the probability of a single relation slightly more in the bubble period than in the
post-bubble period. The other derivatives are also comparable across sub-periods. The most
striking difference is the impact of R&D-expenses. In the bubble period, more R&D expenses
decrease the probability of a single relation: this supports the Bhattacharya–Chiesa hypothesis
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13 There are several event studies that examine the stock market reaction to the news of having a bank relation. For
example, see James (1987), Billett et al. (1995) and Shockley and Thakor (1998).
14 See Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) for the hold-up problem.
that highly rated firms try to deal with many banks in order to disclose as little information as they
can. In the post-bubble period, however, the significant impact of R&D expenses vanishes. As for
the goodness of fit of the model, the pseudo-coefficients of determination are around 0.1, but the
correct prediction rate is around 90% for all models. In general, we can conceive the relatively
stable impact of the selected determinants on the single–multiple decision irrespective of the
choice of GDi’s.
Once firms decided to have multiple loans, how many relations do they have? We analyze this
decision by a multinomial logit model with the same explanatory variables as in the binomial
logit model. In the estimation of the multinomial logit model, the number of bank relations
(NBL) is transformed into the categorical variables shown in Table 1. It should be noted here that
the firms with a single bank relation are excluded from the sample in this stage of estimation. That
is to say, the dependent variable Y takes the following values corresponding to each category of
bank relations:
(1) 2–4 relations, Y = 0;
(2) 5–7 relations, Y = 1;
(3) 8–10 relations, Y = 2;
(4) 11–15 relations, Y = 3;
(5) over 16 relations, Y = 4.
Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of the multinomial logit model. The estimation is
based on the new sample that excludes the observations with a single bank relation. The numbers
of observations for the three different sample periods are also shown in Table 2. Table 5 has the
same structure as Table 4. We present both the estimated parameters and the impact of the
explanatory variables on the probabilities of corresponding choices. In estimating the model, the
parameters for the choice of the smallest number of relations (2–4 bank relations) are normalized
to zero. Thus, all parameters should be interpreted as differences from the base case Y = 0. We
include only the results for one of the main bank relation variables GD3.
15
Table 5 shows that in most cases there is a split between less than and more than 8 banking
contacts. Take for example the impact of the debt-to-assets ratio (DAR).A lower solvability (higher
DAR) decreases the probability of having less than 8 contacts and increases the probabilities of the
large contact classes. For the liquid assets ratio (LAR) the reverse holds. Liquidity-rich firms have
higher probabilities of having up to 8 bank contacts. For the governance dummy variable GD3 we
find that the probability of multiple banking contacts (more than 8) increases. This is again in line
with the results we found in the previous model of the choice between a single or multiple loans.
Apart from these three main determinants, we now also observe that size (SAL), profitability
(ROA), and the financing alternatives matter in some cases. We find that larger firms want more
bank relations, especially for the large numbers of banking contacts (more than 11). There is also
some evidence that in the post-bubble period profitability matters.More profitable firmswantmore
bank relations; this finding implies that most of the loss-making firms will tend to have fewer bank
relations. Alternative financing forms (the availability of corporate bonds, CBR, and short-term
loans SLR) tend to make firms opt for a moderate (up to 8 loan contacts) or extensive number of
banking relations. For the first group there could be a substitution of financing means while for the
latter group the signaling function might be relevant. R&D-intensive firms tend to have a larger
K. Ogawa et al. / Economic Systems 31 (2007) 49–70 63
15 The choice of the governance dummy does not substantially affect the estimated results. Accordingly, we present the


































Estimation results of the multinomial logit model of the number of bank relations
SAL ROA DAR LAR CBR SLR R&D GD3
Sample period: 1982–1999, R2 = 0.2423, LR = 3363.62**
(2) 5–7 0.0009* (2.40) 0.0108 (1.57) 0.0217** (12.3) 0.0180** (9.29) 0.0065** (3.36) 0.0002 (0.11) 0.0277 (1.56) 0.6715** (8.12)
(3) 8–10 0.0005 (1.30) 0.0177* (2.29) 0.0469** (23.2) 0.0364** (17.1) 0.0088** (4.08) 0.0077** (3.60) 0.0057 (0.30) 0.9979** (11.6)
(4) 11–15 0.0023** (7.28) 0.0100 (1.17) 0.0580** (25.1) 0.0386** (16.5) 0.0062* (2.57) 0.0107** (4.41) 0.0006 (0.03) 1.3116** (14.6)
(5) 16– 0.0030** (9.18) 0.0214 (1.92) 0.0817** (24.2) 0.0584** (19.7) 0.0014 (0.44) 0.0049 (1.51) 0.1223** (4.66) 1.6701** (15.1)
(1) 2–4 0.0593 0.0006 0.0069 0.0052 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006 0.1654
(2) 5–7 0.3494 0.0040 0.0022 0.0012 0.0005 0.0010 0.0077 0.0082
(3) 8–10 0.0001 0.0028 0.0029 0.0025 0.0009 0.0008 0.0007 0.0476
(4) 11–15 0.2647 0.0007 0.0034 0.0019 0.0002 0.0010 0.0011 0.0749
(5) 16– 0.1494 0.0010 0.0028 0.0020 0.0004 0.0000 0.0075 0.0510
Sample period: 1982–1989, R2 = 0.2804, LR = 1496.39**
(2) 5–7 0.0015* (2.27) 0.0355** (2.62) 0.0277** (8.45) 0.0191** (5.26) 0.0030 (0.69) 0.0015 (0.46) 0.0180 (0.59) 0.9220** (6.32)
(3) 8–10 0.0002 (0.35) 0.0086 (0.63) 0.0557** (15.0) 0.0411** (10.4) 0.0122* (2.57) 0.0016 (0.47) 0.0112 (0.32) 1.3036** (8.67)
(4) 11–15 0.0018** (3.33) 0.0165 (1.03) 0.0711** (16.2) 0.0439** (10.1) 0.0053 (0.94) 0.0173** (4.15) 0.0226 (0.58) 1.5435** (9.61)
(5) 16– 0.0022** (3.91) 0.0116 (0.59) 0.0973** (15.8) 0.0714** (13.4) 0.0340** (4.95) 0.0033 (0.62) 0.1938** (4.26) 1.7377** (8.69)
(1) 2–4 0.0275 0.0035 0.0079 0.0055 0.0013 0.0007 0.0046 0.1971
(2) 5–7 0.4092 0.0060 0.0025 0.0018 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 0.0089
(3) 8–10 0.0210 0.0013 0.0032 0.0028 0.0011 0.0004 0.0035 0.0715
(4) 11–15 0.2415 0.0004 0.0040 0.0020 0.0005 0.0021 0.0014 0.0758
(5) 16– 0.1192 0.0016 0.0032 0.0025 0.0016 0.0005 0.0105 0.0409
Sample period: 1990–1999, R2 = 0.2424, LR = 2093.15**
(2) 5–7 0.0006 (1.25) 0.0027 (0.35) 0.0198** (9.28) 0.0196** (8.51) 0.0087** (3.98) 0.0008 (0.33) 0.0519* (2.32) 0.5509** (5.43)
(3) 8–10 0.0006 (1.31) 0.0331** (3.45) 0.0442** (18.02) 0.0351** (13.85) 0.0144** (5.80) 0.0101** (3.69) 0.0092 (0.39) 0.8443** (8.00)
(4) 11–15 0.0026** (6.49) 0.0267** (2.58) 0.0529** (19.05) 0.0378** (13.58) 0.0082** (3.04) 0.0069* (2.27) 0.0089 (0.35) 1.2121** (11.1)
(5) 16– 0.0035** (8.39) 0.0288* (2.15) 0.0764** (18.55) 0.0526** (14.71) 0.0070 (1.84) 0.0084* (2.01) 0.0829* (2.50) 1.6235** (12.1)
(1) 2–4 0.1115 0.0031 0.0065 0.0053 0.0018 0.0008 0.0031 0.1481
(2) 5–7 0.3133 0.0030 0.0021 0.0006 0.0004 0.0012 0.0117 0.0164
(3) 8–10 0.0199 0.0037 0.0029 0.0023 0.0014 0.0013 0.0036 0.0348
(4) 11–15 0.2817 0.0016 0.0031 0.0019 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 0.0760
(5) 16– 0.1629 0.0007 0.0026 0.0016 0.0001 0.0002 0.0056 0.0536
The figures in parentheses are the asymptotic t-values, and the symbols * and ** indicate that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 5% level and 1% level, respectively. R2 is the pseudo-R-squared
and LR is the likelihood ratio for testing zero-slope. The impact of SAL on probability is in terms of 103. Marginal probabilities are in the lower panel for each sample period.
probability of havingmultiple relations (more than 16).We do not find striking differences between
the bubble and post-bubble period.
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the number of long-term bank relations that Japanese listed firms
maintain. Japanese firms have a median of 6 long-term bank relations (while the mean is about 7
relations). Compared to other countries this is about the averagevalue observed.But Japanese listed
firms show a rather large variation around themean.We present an overview of the rather extensive
literature in the field of the optimal number of creditors. From this literature, we retrieve a set of
likely candidate variables that might have an impact on the number of bank relations. We focus on
long-term loans, since these loans play a crucial role in the Japanese economy.We estimate discrete
choicemodels of the decision for single versusmultiple relations and the decision to have a number
of bank relations in certain classes (in a multinomial logit model).
Our general conclusions are as follows. Size, profitability, solvability, liquidity, and alternative
financing forms determine the number of banking contacts. These variables are standard
determinants of the number of bank relations. Our results also support the liquidity insurance
argument to have multiple relations, as well as the impact of solvability. We pay special attention
to the impact of Japanese corporate governance by including indicators of the types of relations
Japanese firms tend to have with their banks. We find on average that firms having a main bank
relation, typically presented by the simultaneous holdings of equity and long-term loans by a
specific bank, tend to have a preference for multiple loan contracts. This might be motivated by
the idea that firms want to signal quality to other financial institutions, prevent abuse of
informational monopoly by the main bank and/or insure against deterioration of the main bank’s
health. Moreover, if the bank is a relatively important equity owner there is a relative decrease of
the desire to have multiple relations. These effects tend to hold for the bubble (1981–1989) and
post-bubble (1990–1999) sub-samples.
The Japanese banking system has shown some drastic changes in the last few years. Bank
concentration increased, so-called bad loans are transferred to special-purpose banks, and in
some cases bank management has been replaced. Our paper shows that Japanese firms tend to
have important links with multiple banks, which makes Japanese corporate behavior dependent
on the developments in the banking sector. For instance, in R&D intensive sectors the role of
banks is important. As Ongena and Smith (2000a) argue, the stability of the banking sector
interacts with the bank–firm networking systems. Banks being central to Japanese development
therefore indeed have an apparent leading role in establishing conditions for a recovery of the
Japanese economy.
Acknowledgements
This research is supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (#16330038) from the
JapaneseMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology from 2004 to 2006.We
are also grateful to the Zengin Foundation for Studies on Economics and Finance for financial
support in an earlier stage of the project, and thank Elena Carletti, Hans Degryse, Maarten
Gelderman, Heinz Hermann, Robert Lensink, Steven Ongena, and participants at the 57th
European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Venice, and the seminars at the University of
Amsterdam, De Nederlandsche Bank, and the Bundesbank for valuable comments and
suggestions.


































Distribution of sample firms by industry
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
(1) Agriculture, forestry and fishery – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 10
(2) Mining – 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 55
(3) Manufacturing – 576 595 626 657 672 678 703 736 761 785 783 782 792 834 846 893 967 958 13,644
(4) Construction – 67 71 80 76 80 85 72 88 93 95 88 89 86 93 105 107 76 82 1,533
(5) Electricity, gas, and water supply – 6 4 4 3 4 4 3 4 5 4 5 6 4 5 6 4 7 8 86
(6) Wholesale and retail trade – 55 82 97 109 125 138 151 167 180 192 191 199 200 226 240 260 308 303 3,223
(8) Real estate – 8 8 7 7 8 7 6 10 13 11 12 11 10 11 14 17 19 20 199
(9) Transportation and communication – 46 43 41 46 45 47 48 47 56 52 48 50 49 52 56 54 63 63 906
(10) Services – 20 35 34 35 35 43 46 49 55 60 59 65 70 76 84 95 109 114 1,084
Total – 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20,740
Appendix B
Number of bank relations with respect to long-term loans
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
0 158 200 235 258 283 315 355 391 406 404 409 404 416 446 479 502 516 508 6,685
1 49 59 59 66 70 82 86 90 96 93 69 62 69 65 69 94 103 89 1,370
2 48 39 50 50 41 48 55 54 73 72 65 68 65 68 82 95 76 85 1,134
3 41 51 54 49 54 47 37 60 57 65 60 67 55 67 60 79 89 75 1,067
4 53 50 50 59 60 54 57 58 57 54 67 72 69 78 78 86 89 84 1,175
5 50 61 63 60 76 65 71 78 70 76 72 66 70 75 75 84 97 95 1,304
6 59 59 53 56 59 65 58 55 51 60 66 60 77 82 83 83 96 98 1,220
7 53 56 43 44 53 49 55 51 68 66 66 61 60 65 72 69 79 93 1,103
8 59 50 53 58 49 52 57 53 55 60 49 57 55 61 70 67 66 67 1,038
9 26 40 57 56 58 53 43 59 63 59 66 61 52 53 57 58 68 72 1,001
10 32 36 38 30 31 35 26 34 35 40 41 47 33 43 43 43 53 56 696
11 22 29 30 35 23 22 20 21 22 30 35 36 47 43 44 45 40 44 588
12 27 24 23 24 23 28 26 24 27 24 28 31 30 36 30 26 44 50 525

































Appendix B (Continued )
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
14 18 8 15 18 13 15 11 10 14 18 23 22 26 23 19 16 21 23 313
15 17 12 10 14 13 8 9 9 13 12 9 18 16 18 14 12 10 20 234
16 14 13 12 14 13 12 11 8 8 10 18 17 19 20 16 11 23 16 255
17 9 7 11 3 7 9 11 8 13 10 8 10 8 5 8 11 15 11 164
18 6 8 2 3 5 7 6 3 6 5 6 8 4 7 5 10 9 10 110
19 3 5 9 10 6 3 2 4 2 5 5 7 5 9 10 5 9 11 110
20 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 1 5 2 1 4 7 8 53
21 4 4 3 1 4 2 1 2 2 1 5 5 3 4 3 4 4 52
22 2 2 3 3 3 4 3 2 1 5 2 4 1 1 1 4 3 44
23 2 2 3 1 2 2 4 2 2 3 5 5 3 5 3 44
24 2 1 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 3 4 22
25 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 10
26 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 14
27 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 8
28 1 1 1 3
29 1 1 1 1 1 5
30 1 1 2
31 2 1 1 1 5
32 1 1 1 3
34 1 1 2
35 2 1 3
36 1 1 1 1 1 5
37 1 1 1 1 4





52 1 1 2
55 1 1
Total 779 840 890 935 971 1005 1030 1103 1167 1203 1191 1208 1217 1302 1356 1435 1554 1554 20,740
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